Democracy for Transnational Regimes by Martens, W.P.M.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a preprint version which may differ from the publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://repository.ubn.ru.nl/handle/2066/127946
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-08-24 and may be subject to
change.
[113]
Comment
evert van der Zweerde
I would like to see a clear demarcation 
between those forms of governance 
that are beyond the state, but of the 
same kind, and those that do ‘govern’, 
but are clearly not ‘political’ in the 
same sense. What, for example, is the 
relationship between government, 
governance, and the role of 
(corporate) financial institutions that 
assess the credibility of nation-states, 
making them loose their AAA-status? 
Most importantly, what does, can 
or should ‘democracy’ mean in such 
cases?
reply
wil martens
Even at the end of my essay I cannot 
fully answer what democracy 
means in the relationship between 
regulatory regimes that severely 
influence nation states. But, this 
essay clarifies what it means to say 
that regulatory regimes that cannot 
be said to depend on states and state-
based democracy are democratized 
themselves. Indeed, the collectives I 
call transnational regimes are in many 
respects different from nation states; 
they are in a certain sense voluntary 
and above all they are only about one 
issue in the life of its participants. 
Nevertheless they are political 
in a sense very similar to politics 
in nation states. Transnational 
regimes entail legislative bodies 
that produce authoritative rules 
for its participants, in a situation of 
divergent values. That is why it makes 
sense, in my opinion, to require their 
democratization.
Democracy for 
Transnational 
Regimes
— Wil Martens
I. Introduction
Regulation of contested social and environmental issues is increas-
ingly a matter of governance arrangements beyond the nation state. 
These arrangements are often distinguished in international, supra-
national, and transnational ones.2 International regulation has the 
sovereignty of states as a starting point and is about voluntary agree-
ments between them. Supranational regulations are hierarchically 
placed above nation-states. Transnational regulations enter into and 
surpass the boundaries of nation-states. This essay concentrates on 
transnational regulations, particularly those in which private3 parties 
are influential. 
Transnational regimes4 have especially been developed to fill voids 
or transplant malfunctioning national and international governments. 
They govern nowadays with regard to internet, safety of goods, food 
safety, quality of labor life, protection of the environment, financial 
aspects of firms, relations in supply chains, epidemics, child labor, 
assessment of scientific work, and many more subjects. Some examples 
of well-known regimes include ICANN (internet), FSC (sustainable 
forests), and ILO (labor life).5 Rules of transnational regimes are in 
many cases accepted or adopted in domestic regulation by nation 
states. It is no exaggeration to say that transnational regimes are very 
influential in daily life . 
The contribution of such regimes to democratically structured life 
is contested. They are on the one hand recognized as indispensable 
forms of effective self-regulation, providing solutions to urgent 
coordination problems. On the other hand they are depicted as 
instruments of domination, subjecting social and individual life to 
rules crafted in the interest of the rich and powerful. In this last role 
they have grave democratic deficits.6 The (un-)democratic character of 
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Comment 
stefan sChevelier
Habermas’s plea for a European 
constitution and a more deliberative 
democratic Europe appears to be a 
successful attempt to generalize his 
theory. In terms of re-specifying, 
others have taken up Habermas’s 
project and taken it to transnational 
and mass-democracy contexts, e.g. 
Bohman, Benhabib.
reply 
wil martens
The situation is, I believe, more 
complicated. 
I will show in part III that Habermas 
is not successful, because (a) he 
misunderstands many transnational 
regimes as being technical matters, 
for which it would be a mistake to 
demand democratization, while 
actually these regimes have a political 
character, and (b) it seems improbable 
that the problems dealt with in these 
regimes can be regulated by means 
of political forms that are either a 
continuation of nation states or that 
have the form of a (federal) state. 
As far as I can see, Bohman and 
Benhabib do not discuss the ‘private’ 
transnational regimes that are central 
in my essay.
transnational regulation is the object of scrutiny in this essay. Its central 
question is: can and should transnational regimes be democratic?7 
This question is especially pertinent with regard to transnational 
regimes in which private parties are influential. In these cases the 
democratic character cannot be based on democracy of nation states, 
as states are one among many actors they cannot control. This makes 
transnational regimes interesting from the perspective of democracy. 
They provoke thoughts about the possibility to democratize 
transnational governance apart from nation states, and about the 
kind of democracy that is then required .
This examination of transnational regimes will draw on Habermas’s 
conception of deliberative democracy.8 Deliberative democracy means, 
roughly, that the laws of a community are prepared by civil discourses, 
and thereupon discussed and decided by representatives of the 
community. This procedure allows us to speak reasonably about self-
regulation of a collective.
Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy proposes an in-
tegrated set of concepts for the description and assessment of the 
different components of self-regulation. More than other concep-
tions of deliberative democracy,9 Habermas’s conception makes clear 
that in modern societies civil discourses are part of a constellation 
of five differentiated but connected regulative elements: preparing 
civil discourses, deciding representative politics, adjudication based 
on politically decided laws, implementing administration, and an 
explicit meta-regulation of these first four elements in a constitu-
tional framework. Only together do they provide democratically 
legitimated authoritative regulation.
Habermas developed his conception of deliberative democracy with 
regard to well-defined populations of nation states. This conception 
cannot simply be applied to transnational regulations, in which 
the specialized national institutions are bypassed and transgressed. 
Transnational regimes seem to lack a well delimited people; as a 
consequence representation is difficult. They seem to exhibit relatively 
undefined ‘soft laws’, and have a lack of enforcement capacities. At first 
glance, it is difficult to imagine how they could be democratic in the 
sense of Habermas’s conception of deliberative democracy.
That it is not easy to generalize and then re-specify Habermas’s theory 
of deliberative democracy for transnational regulation is shown by his 
own attempt to do so . He sees no transnational alternative for the 
rather well-defined peoples of nation-states as bases of deliberation 
and representation, and consequently thinks about transnational 
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Comment
evert van der Zweerde
Here, I think, the question of agency 
becomes crucial: WHO is going to 
actualize this potentiality? Are these 
transnational regimes to become 
(more) democratic in the sense 
outlined by you, or are they to be 
made (more) democratic.
reply 
wil martens
I hope to show that they can be 
democratized, that some of them 
already are partly democratized by 
using, in their own way, the forms of 
democracy developed in nation states, 
and finally, I will emphasize that this 
must be required of them by persons 
and collectives that are interested in 
having a voice in realization of values 
that are at stake in the regimes.
democracy as a continuation of national democracy. This train of 
thought leads him to a partly false and partly very bleak description of 
the possibilities of democratic transnational regimes, especially those 
in which private parties are influential. Habermas cannot imagine 
a demos and a democratic decision-making process for such cases. I 
will argue, however, that it is possible to reconstruct transnational 
regimes in terms of representation of a delimited demos, producing 
authoritative rules that are recognizable as the rules of the people. This 
kind of description enables an assessment of the democratic character 
of regimes that (fail to) take the values and meanings of persons and 
collectives they subject to their rule into consideration. It opens an 
unexpected view on a broad range of issue-centered regimes that 
accommodate a diversity of values in a more-or-less democratic way. 
My argument proceeds in four stages. First, I give a short overview of 
the main concepts of Habermas’s idea of deliberative democracy for 
modern nation-states. This overview explicitly focuses on what I see as 
the five core components of deliberative democracy, which in attempts 
to use this conception for transnational regimes are normally perceived 
only partially. From the nation-state model I distill a general conception 
of democratically legitimated authoritative regulation. Second, I assess 
Habermas’s attempt to adopt his conception of national deliberative 
democracy for a reconstruction of transnational regimes as a form of 
democracy. This attempt is disappointing as it fails to investigate the 
democratic characteristics and possibilities of transnational regulation 
apart from national democracy. Third, I undertake a reconstruction 
of the democratic qualities of transnational regimes. It shows that 
these regimes are able to integrate  the ‘instruments’ of democracy 
developed in the nation-state: public discourse, representation, law, 
administration and constitution, in flexible, value-oriented collectives. 
This is the central part of the essay. In the fourth and last stage I 
conclude that transnational regimes can be seen as worthy forms of 
value-oriented self-regulation of collectives and not just as temporary 
substitutes for state-based national or cosmopolitan democracy.
II. Components of Deliberative Democracy for the 
Nation State
Before I describe the core components of deliberative democracy, 
I offer a short characterization of some of its premises. Habermas’s 
conception of deliberative democracy in Between Facts and Norms is 
devised “to show how the old promise of a self-organizing community 
of free and equal citizens can be reconceived under the conditions 
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Comment
stefan sChevelier
Remarks like this are based on 
the mistaken assumption that 
nation-states offer qualitatively 
different kinds of possibilities for 
identification. The obvious examples 
for identification are trivial (the 
color orange, national football team, 
or stroopwafels), shared by other 
countries (language, climate, level 
of wealth), or could be created/
discovered/recovered, in other spaces 
(a shared history, head of state, shared 
culture).
The current collection of nation-
states is young, and contingent. States 
like India contain more diversity and 
a larger number of citizens than the 
whole of Europe combined. Tell 
me why a nation-state like India is 
possible, but a united Europe is not.
reply
wil martens
Probably we underestimate iden-
tification if it is thought about as a 
matter of (trivial) symbols only. We 
all have many feelings of belonging 
and solidarity. We (can) see family, 
neighborhood, city, nation, but also 
Europe and the World as collectivities 
we belong to and identify with. I am 
not sure that we know very well how 
this complex works.
Comment
stefan sChevelier
Complex modern societies extend 
beyond national borders. Likewise, 
discourse and will-formation extends 
beyond borders.
Or, would you argue that a 
discussion about the preservation 
of the rainforest is only public will 
formation if it is about a rainforest in 
‘our’ country, with a co-national?
reply
wil martens
Of course, communication and co-
operation extend beyond boundaries, 
but that does only mean that national 
societies do not regulate all the ac-
tions and communications of ‘their’ 
population. And, of course Haber-
mas agrees that discussions about 
rainforests are public will-formation 
beyond national borders. But when 
these discussions take place between 
non-state organizations, are they 
then public discussions and public 
will-formation? I believe that there is 
a conceptual problem on this point in 
Habermas.
of complex societies”.10 The objective of his ‘reconstruction’ is to 
answer the question in which way and to what extent modern complex 
societies can and should realize the normative idea of self-regulation 
of a community.11
Complex societies are, in this case, nation-states in which a people, 
characterized by a plurality of values, meanings and identities,12 decides 
as a political community, through discursive processes of opinion- and 
will-formation, about the legal rules it wants to obey to. Discursive 
processes give birth to a reasoned public opinion that functions as the 
basis for political legislation, which provides the legitimate framework 
for adjudication and administration. Citizens of these societies are 
protected and affected by the normative rules drafted by legislation 
on the basis of public discourse; they build a delimited collective with 
which they can identify.13 Habermas contrasts the nation-state with the 
‘European Union’ and the ‘World’, which do not have public opinions, 
and hardly offer possibilities for identification ,14 characteristics that 
make them inapt for ‘autonomous’ democratization.15
In relation to these premises Habermas describes deliberative 
democracy’s discursive processes as taking place in civil society on the 
one hand, and in formal political institutions on the other. Together 
they produce the legitimate rules of a community. Civil society is a 
complex of communications in which free and equal citizens debate 
and deliberate, more or less unconstrained, about preferable ways of 
living and about the values, goals and rules that should orient them. 
In complex modern societies citizens come from a plurality of cultural 
backgrounds and inspirations. The general normative idea behind 
Habermas’s model of democracy is that these citizens all have equal 
rights and possibilities to participate in communication .16
Formal political institutions (government and parliament) produce 
deliberations and decisions about the laws of a community. They are 
empowered by the people to produce its laws. Empowerment takes place 
in general elections that appoint some citizens as representatives of the 
community for the production of its laws. Rights and obligations of 
representatives to produce laws can be withdrawn in future elections.
In their law-making processes, legislators draw on normative, 
pragmatic and empirical reasons they dispose of on the basis of 
general and free debates and deliberations in civil society. In this 
respect, political institutions function as an outflow of civil society. 
They are embedded in the whole of communications of the free and 
equal citizens of a nation-state, and build “the organized midpoint or 
focus of the society-wide circulation of informal communication”.17 
Legislation within the framework of the indicated democratic 
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procedure results in legitimate laws, which are collectively binding for 
a national community. Such laws are produced in accordance with 
the so called ‘principle of democratic legitimacy,’ stating that “only 
those statutes may claim legitimacy that meet with the assent of all 
citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been 
legally instituted.”18
Laws are most of the time too general and too open to be cognitively 
helpful as clear guidelines for the behavior of citizens. They need 
specification and mediation if they are to support the attainment of 
collective goals and values. Besides, under pluralist circumstances 
laws encounter a motivational problem. Modern citizens do not share 
one culture with unquestioned habits, values, and norms. This means 
that the laws prescribe behaviors that for parts of the population 
are counterintuitive, and directed at strange or even abject values 
and goals. Laws must therefore be supplemented with monitoring 
and sanctioning, which ascertain obedience to the rules when 
intrinsic ethical and moral motivation are lacking.19 Specification and 
supplementation of legislative rules occurs through ‘administration’ 
and ‘adjudication’, themselves regulated by law.
The operations of the executive and coercive organizations of the mod-
ern state – the administration – mediate the realization of laws. Networks 
of organizations concretize the general laws, for example with respect 
to housing or education, with rules for typical cases. They develop pro-
grams for the realization of values, goals, and norms, take decisions in 
individual cases, and are legitimated to command the use of force if that 
is necessary for the realization of the law in their domain.20
On the basis of knowledge of the characteristics of their domains, 
administrative organizations prepare law-proposals for the legislative 
bodies. The administrators of a domain have a profound influence 
on legislative processes through these proposals, and through the 
orientation of the implementation of laws by their own normative 
reasoning and their communication with affected citizens. 
Administration is therefore never simply the execution of the results 
of public and political deliberation and decision-making. It is not a 
strategic-instrumental21 consequence of the democratically decided 
normative rules, as Habermas sometimes suggests. Administration 
involves normative programs that are developed in discursive exchanges 
with politics and affected citizens. These discursive exchanges entail 
opportunities for the democratization of administrations. Thinking 
along these lines could be fruitful for an understanding of transnational 
regimes, as I will show in part IV of this essay.
4
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Adjudication is the process of coherent and consistent application of 
laws to particular cases, in order to determine whether these cases 
conform to the laws.22 Judgments about conformity or non-conformity 
are produced by an organized complex of courts. The judgments of 
the courts should guarantee (a) certainty and (b) legitimacy.23 Certainty 
means that actors should know which behavior is legally required 
and enforced. It demands consistent application of the law, within 
the framework of an existing legal order. Certainty makes behavior 
consistent and predictable, which in turn enhances its coordination 
in associations, organizations, and societal subsystems. Legitimacy 
concerns the reasonability of the procedures used to make and apply 
the laws. A court decision must not only fit in the framework of 
existing positive law, it must also harmonize with rules and principles 
that are at the moment of decision accepted as reasonable. If conditions 
and values change after law-generation, positive law can appear as 
unreasonable. In that case judges must look for reasonable decisions 
that take relevant features of the situation into consideration. 
Certainty and reasonability are contradictory demands. Taking new 
situations and their consequences into account to avoid unreasonable 
judgments produces indeterminacy that must be closed by ‘interpreta-
tive reasoning’ of judges.24 This leads to the creation of new rules and 
therefore to uncertainty for cases that must be adjudicated. Habermas 
diagnoses this tension, and concludes that judges cannot avoid being 
legislators who make political choices.25 This is why courts come up 
with justifications for their legislative decisions,26 which can become 
elements of public discourses. Public discussion about case law made 
by the courts democratizes this kind of legislation.27
Both in administration and in adjudication one finds thus that the 
application of politically decided laws can never be purely realization. 
Administration and adjudication always entail creative or legislative 
moments. Habermas admits28 that these legislative moments should 
and also could be democratized by the installation of discursive 
procedures, in which justifications for this legislation are investigated 
and debated. Democratic legislation is for this reason not only a 
matter of the functionally specialized instances of parliament and 
government, but also of public discussions about ‘peripheral’ law-
making in administration and adjudication.
It is, finally, characteristic for modern regulation by law that the 
rules for legislation, administration, and adjudication are themselves 
laid down in meta-laws, called constitutions. Constitutions prescribe 
amongst other things: delimitations of citizenship, equal rights of 
5
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Comment
stefan sChevelier
At a glance, the concept of a 
territorially delimited people seems 
very appealing and even intuitive. But 
what exactly does the term mean? 
What do territories and people have 
in common? What is delimited about 
a people? What is delimited about a 
people’s territory? I am not quite sure 
yet what distinguishes transnational 
from nation state regimes.
reply
wil martens
In a nation state the people is delim-
ited by geographical boundaries. Gov-
ernment concerns all the respects of 
all those persons that live within cer-
tain boundaries. In transnational re-
gimes delimitation is based on regula-
tion with regard to issues. The people 
can be spread all over the world.
citizens to elect representatives; rights, obligations and procedures 
of the legislative bodies; rights and obligations of the courts and the 
administrative bodies. A function of constitutions is to protect rules 
for democratic legislation and implementation against disagreement 
and disobedience of powerful parts of society. A constitution that 
legalizes the idea of authority as ultimately stemming from the will of 
civil society is the keystone of the whole of institutions of deliberative 
democracy.29
Is it possible to transplant the summarized components of delibera-
tive democracy for nation states to transnational regimes? Habermas’s 
conception of deliberative democracy presupposes the existence of a 
people that is delimited from other peoples by territorial boundaries 
and by identification with the nation. National communities are at the 
same time characterized by a plurality of values and interests. Trans-
national regimes do not concern a territorially delimited people ; 
they are on the contrary characterized by participants, values, laws, ad-
ministrations, and adjudications that transgress territorial boundaries. 
Identification with a regime is not easy in this situation. With respect 
to plurality, however, transnational regimes are not very different from 
nation-states. Regimes normally include a range of ‘stakeholders’ with 
a variety of values and interests.
When we abstract from the kind of delimitation and identification 
that are typical for the nation-state, but keep in mind the demands 
of self-regulation by law under pluralist circumstances, we find a set 
of generalized characteristics of deliberative democracy, which can also 
be applied in reconstructive descriptions of transnational regimes. 
This procedure provides the following general characteristics of the 
components of deliberative democracy:
(a) A delimited people rules itself via the detour of a specialized 
political-legislative entity that is authorized to produce explicitly 
formulated, collectively binding laws.
(b) Pluralism of values of the people demands representation and 
legislation by means of procedures that make laws acceptable for 
its various parts.
(c) Formal political legislation should depend on free opinion-
formation in which all demos-members have equal rights and 
opportunities to participate. Legitimacy of laws depends on public 
discourse.
(d) Legislation must be supplemented by administration and adjudi-
cation that take care of specification, monitoring and sanctioning, 
to overcome cognitive and motivational deficits of the members of 
the demos. 
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(e)  Administration and adjudication are not purely realization of law, 
but fulfill also legislative functions. In this sense they could and 
should be democratized.
(f) Rights and obligations of members, legislation, administration 
and adjudication are in turn described in constitutions, which are 
adjudicated and enforced. 
III. Deliberative Democracy Beyond the Nation-State
Soon after Between Facts and Norms Habermas realized that his 
theory of politics and law neglected the increased supranational and 
transnational regulation, which influences the laws inside nation 
states. States have lost a considerable proportion of their autonomous 
regulative capacity. This development is taken into account in 
Habermas’s further political thought.30 For the theory of deliberative 
democracy this means paying attention to the question, how self-
rule of a people can be realized in the case of regulation beyond the 
nation state. The following sections concentrate on Habermas’s 
reconstruction of transnational regimes. Special attention is given to 
some features that make this conception implausible.
Habermas’s description of regulation beyond the nation-state sticks 
to most of the main convictions displayed in Between Facts and Norms. 
He states that (a) democratic politics (civil society and legislation) should 
guarantee the ruled a determining influence on the orientation of the 
rulers and the content of the laws. In this vein he demands democracy 
for supra- and transnational regulation. (b) Laws require adjudication 
and administration that take care of their implementation. The last 
requirement can only be fulfilled by an authorized administrative ap-
paratus, enjoying a monopoly on violence.31 (c) Democratic legislation 
based on political identity, public discourse, and elected legislation ex-
ists for the time being only in national communities. Supranational and 
transnational legislation are at best democratic in an indirect way.32
In supranational governance collaborating nation-states give birth 
to authoritative regional or world-wide institutions. Important exam-
ples are the European Union, the World Trade Organization and or-
ganizations such as the World Health Organization and the Food and 
Agricultural Organization, of the United Nations. Habermas inter-
prets the institutions of the United Nations as a starting point of “a ... 
world organization specialized in securing peace and implementing 
human rights worldwide”.33 These institutions could be developed 
into a fully fledged guarantee of the basic rights of all nation-states 
and of their individual citizens. Under this regime the world organi-
1
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zation would also protect individual citizens against rule violations 
by the states they live in.34
The United Nations institutions have a hierarchical status vis-à-vis 
the member states, and would decide and implement the principles, 
norms and measures agreed upon by the participating nation states.35 
A ‘world-government’ would, in Habermas’s conception, however, 
not dispose of the means of enforcement necessary for the guarantee 
of peace and human rights. These means should be lent by the mem-
ber states of the international community. This results in a limited 
world constitution (concerning the issues of peace and human rights) 
and a world government without a state, in the sense of capabilities 
to exercise political power through administration, police and 
military force.36
Democracy in the supranational sphere is a matter of continuation 
of national democracy. In the case of the institutions of the United 
Nations “democratic states […] represent the most important source 
of democratic legitimation for a legally constituted world society”.37 
The legitimation of political decisions, which is produced by opinion 
and will formation in civil society and politics, can in supranational 
governance not proceed directly from citizens to governing power. The 
individuals should in this case be represented by state-functions and 
institutions – representing the representatives of a people –, deemed 
responsible for their national citizens.38 
World-wide and regional transnational regimes concern functional 
domains and are in Habermas’s view important for decent living, 
justice, and prevention of ecological threats. In these domains 
networks of states, corporations, and non-governmental organi-
zations address problems created by the dependencies of the 
‘functional differentiation of world society’. Global functional 
differentiation demands coordination that enables world-wide 
interdependent, problem-oriented spheres of activities.39 These 
coordination problems cannot be dealt with by individual nation-
states; they involve activities in many states and often involve 
nation-states without effective regulation.
Habermas sorts transnational coordination problems into two 
categories: those that are more or less ‘technical’, and those that have 
a genuinely ‘political’ character.40 These two kinds of problems are and 
should be dealt with in different kinds of institutional arrangements. 
I will emphasize later (III, 8) that this is a problematic distinction.
Technical problems are handled in networks that coordinate 
governmental and non-governmental actors through information 
exchange, consultation, control, and agreement. Examples Habermas 
4
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Comment  
stefan sChevelier
What is political and what is 
technical is itself a political question. 
For instance, the regulation of 
telecommunication is only functional 
if it does not serve some political 
agenda, which, in light of the NSA 
scandal is patently not the case.
reply 
wil martens
I do not think that the distinction 
between the political and the 
technical is made in the political 
domain. Declaring climate to be 
technical means to cover its political 
character. Whether something is 
political or not depends on the 
different values and interests that 
are connected to objects and events. 
If there is contestation about values 
and interests, something is political.
points to are: standardization of measures, for instance of quality 
management or administration; regulation of telecommunication, 
like the internet; disaster prevention; containing epidemics and 
combating international crime. Regulation in these functional 
domains can proceed in an instrumental fashion, and does not in his 
eyes require democratization.
Political problems concern functions with impact on interests 
rooted in (more or less just) distribution-structures of national 
societies. Examples here are global energy, environmental problems, 
financial and economic policy. In these last cases, Habermas thinks, 
the functionally differentiated, multilateral networks must be 
structured in such a way that representatives of democratic nation-
states or supranational entities can have the last word. This idea can 
only function if political power is concentrated in the hands of few 
global players (like USA, China, EU) that are able to negotiate binding 
compromises and implement the resulting rules for large territories .41
For political cases Habermas discusses (a) decision-making, implemen-
tation and enforceability, and (b) legitimacy.
(Ad a) Decision-making, implementation and enforceability are a 
problem, because “in issues of truly global political scope, we lack 
at present the necessary institutions and procedures to decide upon 
programs and implement them on a broad scale.”42 In other words, 
legislation and administration for a cosmopolitan democratic order do 
not exist. Besides, actors that are capable to introduce procedures and 
institutions of this order are lacking. As long as nation-states define 
themselves as competing sovereign entities that want maximum 
influence on transnational issues, it will be difficult to change this.
(Ad b) Democratic legitimacy of political regulations depends on the 
legitimacy of the negotiating and deciding partners – they should be 
representatives of the respective nation-states and their populations 
– and the democratic nature of the procedures for decision-making. 
Besides, legitimacy demands well-developed processes of public 
political opinion- and will-formation in the involved nation-states 
with regard to important transnational issues. Democratic legitimacy 
is difficult, because the relationship between representatives and 
represented is long and unclear; representatives stand for national 
populations as a whole, and hide the plurality of values and interests 
with respect to particular issues. Besides, the opinion- and will-
formation processes of citizens and politicians on transnational issues 
are ill-developed; they concentrate on issues that are decided upon 
by national politics, which allow political parties to demonstrate the 
differences between them and their rivals.43
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Comment 
evert van der Zweerde
If they should be left to experts, who 
decides about this? At nation-state 
level, the question which problems 
should be left to experts can be 
decided democratically, but that 
means that any normative statement 
that particular problems should be 
left to experts is a position within 
a political field. So, why has it been 
decided already when it comes to this 
higher level?
reply
wil martens
It seems indeed reasonable to 
suppose that in Habermas’s opinion 
decisions about whether or not 
something is a technical issue result 
from public opinion formation and 
political discussion. But that is only 
half the story. When Habermas says 
that something is technical he means: 
it is true that this issue is not a matter 
of contested values and interests in 
social reality. Against this I will hold 
that the issues, which Habermas 
calls technical, are contested in social 
reality, and are therefore political.
What conclusions can be drawn from Habermas’s attempt to 
reconstruct nation-state-transgressing-governance as a matter of 
continuation of national deliberative democracy? For the political issues 
dominated by powerful regional regimes his analysis shows, firstly, 
that the representation of the value-plurality of the people, which is 
typical for the nation-state, cannot be continued on a transnational 
level.44 Political discussions, party programs, and elections in nation-
states are about the national way of life in all its different respects. 
National parties differ on constellations of issues. This organization of 
political life is indeed ill-suited for representation of divergent values 
and interests in transnational regimes, which are about single issues. 
Secondly, it indicates that severe obstacles for civil discourses about 
transnational issues exist on the national level. Together these points 
make the prospects for deliberative democracy concerning ‘genuine 
political’ transnational issues very bleak.
Transnational networks occupied with, what Habermas calls, 
technical issues seem to have no chance at all to get democratized. 
They do not count as objects worth democratizing. Democracy is 
superfluous or even disturbing here, as these networks deal with 
problems that should be left  to the instrumental efforts of experts.
A more general point can be added here. As long as nation states 
describe themselves as sovereign units that in the first place look for 
their own relative advantages, there is little hope that these states 
converge on issues that are important for humanity as a whole. 
Successful coordination on issues like climate-change, world-wide 
poverty, weapons of mass destruction, and pollution is very improbable 
when nation-states compete for power and wealth.
In summary, Habermas’s reconstruction amounts to a vision 
in which democracy remains in the first place a matter of nation-
states. Ever more fields and issues of modern social life shirk of the 
demand for democracy, because it is either politically impracticable or 
technically ill-suited. Ongoing expansion of transnational cooperation 
and corresponding functional governance means, in his analysis, 
that the importance of democracy will steadily decrease. Actions will 
instead be regulated by powerful elites and experts, producing rules 
which were never thought, communicated and decided about by the 
humans they affect.
Confronted with this result of Habermas’s reconstruction of trans-
national regimes, the question arises whether its arguments for 
a negative assessment of the possibilities of democratization of 
transnational regimes are convincing. I think they are not, for several 
reasons. 
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Comment
stefan sChevelier
Our primary concern should be 
to identify the peculiarities of the 
transnational sphere. Does such a 
sphere exist, and how is it different 
from the national sphere?
The whole language we use to talk 
about politics – be it local or global – 
is tainted by the dominant status of 
nation-states. The challenge is to use 
a different language
Comment
evert van der Zweerde
There is no particular reason why 
transnational regimes should limit 
themselves to the issue for which they 
were designed. No relevant societal 
issue is obvious or uncontestable. For 
example, WorldBank and IMF have 
a major impact on the economies 
of developing countries. So, where 
does the financial issue end and the 
political issue start? 
Things become particularly compli-
cated when transnational regimes 
like the IMF and supranational insti-
tutions like the ECB join hands and 
work together in solving, for exam-
ple, the crisis in Greece. The demos 
of Greece ended up by putting Hit-
ler moustaches on Angela Merkel’s 
face. There is a lot of simplification 
and exaggeration there, of course, 
but they are right in sensing that the 
political responsibility, and, ultimate-
ly, accountability of Merkel and the 
allegedly a-political responsibility of 
Mario Draghi and Christine Lagarde, 
are mixed and confused. 
The critical point here, I think, is not 
that Lagarde and Draghi are beyond 
democratic control while Merkel is 
not, but that the way in which their 
roles are connected is never object of 
democratic deliberation (of talk, yes, 
but not of deliberation in the way you 
use it) and decision-making.
reply
stefan sChevelier
I agree with Evert van der Zweerde. 
You depart from a specific conception 
of transnational regimes – namely 
regimes that operate across borders 
and restrict themselves to a specific 
issue, – then you identify such 
functional regimes, and then you 
confine potential transnational 
politics to your limited definition of 
transnational regimes.
Actual transnational politics displays 
more variety than this discussion 
shows. To use an example from 
my own contribution to this [...] 
(a) Taking a more precise look, the dichotomy of ‘technical’ and 
‘political’ issues is doubtful. Many, if not all, of the so called techni- 
cal regimes are actually political, in the sense that their rules 
address and affect persons, associations and organizations oriented 
at divergent values, goals and interests. The political character 
of, for example, regimes for internet, containment of epidemics, 
forest stewardship, and financial accounting is evident from past 
discussions about the dominance of certain interests in them, and 
from the divergent demands for changes of their rules. There are 
very few issues and regimes that are not political and could for this 
reason do without democracy.
This observation does not provide a solution for the problem of how 
to democratize. On the contrary, it aggravates the problem. Because 
the indicated regimes are predominantly private regimes, it is even 
harder to imagine their democratization via participating nation-
states than in the case of ‘political’ ones.
(b) Habermas did not prove that transnational regimes can only be 
democratized indirectly, as a continuation of national democracies. 
This was merely suggested by his argument that a delimited people with 
a political identity, a public discourse, and an elected legislation can 
only exist in national communities. But he did not analyze any failures 
to democratize transnational regimes. As long as the impossibility of 
a reconstruction of transnational regimes as democratic institutions 
has not been more carefully considered, Habermas’s judgment is 
unconvincing, and there remains hope for direct democratization of 
these regimes.
IV. Deliberative Democracy for Transnational Regimes
What could the generalized conception of deliberative democracy, 
presented in II.8, mean in the specific case of transnational regimes? 
An attempt to answer this question can start with some considerations 
about demos in its relation to transnational regimes. They concern: (a) 
the delimitation of a demos; and (b) the respects in which a relation of 
demos and authoritative rulers exists. These two points are intimately 
related and will be discussed together. Based on that I will deal with 
the specificity of (c) value and interest pluralism; (d) public discourse 
and legislation; e) administration and adjudication; and f) the meta-
rules or constitution, in the case of transnational regimes. For each of 
these respects I will describe the characteristics that contribute to a 
regime’s democracy, and the measure in which some current regimes 
are already partially democratic . 
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[...]volume, Avaaz is an organization 
that commits itself to “organiz[ing] 
citizens of all nations to close the gap 
between the world we have and the 
world most people everywhere want.” 
This is not a one-issue group. Avaaz 
is of course not a regime, but it is an 
integral part of transnational politics.
reply
wil martens
Three clarifications are in place here. 
First, I could indeed have formulated: 
an issue or issue-complex. Second, 
and that is something different, 
regimes may be oriented at the 
realization of a default value in a 
domain, but that does not imply 
they are restricted to one value. 
Later on (especially IV.8) I emphasize 
they have to accommodate a variety 
of values. Third, it is important to 
distinguish transnational regimes 
from transnational organizations 
(like Avaaz and ECB), that (can) play 
a role in or for regimes.
Comment
evert van der Zweerde
This notion of ‘acceptability of 
these norms’ is an example of the 
quintessential Habermasian trick. 
Acceptability means, I presume, 
something like ‘would be accepted 
on the basis of a domination-free 
discussion between citizens regarding 
each other as free and equal.’ 
The point, however, when it comes to 
politics and especially to democratic 
politics, is not about acceptability 
in general, but about concrete 
acceptance. 
 
reply
wil martens
For Habermas, acceptability means 
concrete acceptance in a situation 
by the persons involved. However, 
Habermas also provides the [...]
[...] insight  that even if all affected 
are somehow involved in the 
decision-making processes, concrete 
acceptance, can be arrived at in 
processes that are marred by deceit 
or threat and thus were inadequate 
for finding an acceptable solution for 
an issue. In such cases there would 
be acceptance that can be criticized. 
I do not believe that Evert van der 
Zweerde would applaud this kind of 
concrete acceptance.
The following presentation concentrates on the way in which 
transnational regimes themselves should be democratic. This of course 
does not mean that I believe that democratic states and supranational 
regimes are superfluous for democracy of transnational regimes. 
Ad. A/B Demos and Rulers Transnational regimes are concerned with an 
issue . To gain better understanding of the delimitation of the demos 
of such regimes, it is useful to examine what it means for something 
to be an issue. Let us assume that child-labor, deterioration of forests, 
world-wide epidemics, food-safety, and global warming are issues. They 
are states of affairs considered as problems that should be resolved or 
prevented. Issues result, in other words, from threats to a value in a 
specific domain. We generally consider health and safety as values; if 
these are threatened for children and food, they can become issues, 
i.e. matters of collective action directed at the realization of otherwise 
threatened values.45 Such issues affect a multitude of persons and 
organizations, and they demand coordinated action for remediation. 
Regimes result from continuous attempts to organize actions in this 
respect. Their demoi receive their delimitation from this construction.
Analyses of issue-based transnational regimes often distinguish 
between three categories of ‘participants’.46 The first category concerns 
the actors that participate in the preparation, production and 
implementation of the regime-rules. These are mainly corporations, 
NGO’s, technical standard setters, experts, national states and 
international organizations. Actors participate in general on a voluntary 
basis; they have or they represent interests in the regulation of the issue 
at hand. The other two categories are made up by the participants who 
are influenced by the rules, further distinguished into: those directly 
addressed by the regime, and those who are (significantly) affected by it. 
Should all these participants be considered as belonging to the demos 
of a regime, and be granted rights to influence its rules, because they 
are submitted to them? Starting from Habermas’s idea of democracy as 
a specification of the general normative principle, which says that the 
validity of the norms of a community depends on the acceptability  
of these norms for all possibly affected persons,47 it seems obvious that 
the demos of a transnational regime consists of all these participants.
Objections against the use of the so-called ‘all-affected principle’ 
for the delimitation of the demos are however abundant. The most 
important either point at the difficulty to discern ‘the affected’ or show 
that the all-affected principle comes at a serious cost to democracy. 
For reasons of space, these objections cannot be discussed in this 
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Comment
stefan sChevelier
If you aim to construct this form 
of transnational democracy on 
Habermasian grounds, you are 
certainly devising an all too exclusive 
criterion. I believe Habermas would 
argue that such regimes should be 
as inclusive as possible. If you are 
not interested in a Habermasian 
foundation for transnational regime, 
you should explain why the actions 
of issue-based regimes do not require 
thorough public deliberative scrutiny.
reply 
wil martens
The question here seems to be: What 
is a Habermasian foundation? I use 
a generalized idea of deliberative 
democracy, and try to specify this 
for the case of transnational regimes. 
I think it is a logical consequence 
of this procedure – which is in 
Habermas’s spirit – to state that 
issue-based regimes should exclude 
persons and organizations that want 
to obstruct the realization of their 
default value. Of course, that is never 
formulated as such by Habermas.
essay. I will concentrate on the presentation of a procedure, which 
allows the legitimate delimitation of the demos. I will indicate only 
marginally that the objections against the all-affected principle do not 
touch this procedure.
The following argument about the delimitation of the demos of 
issue-based regimes presupposes the existence of constellations of 
organizations, associations and persons that regulate their collective 
actions in order to realize a value for a circumscribed domain. Such 
regimes are based on the insight that value realization depends on 
collective intentions that are supported by a set of connected rules 
or programs.
Issue-based regimes are voluntary in the sense that organizations, 
associations and persons participate in them because they share the 
value-orientation of the regime, and accept that the realization of this 
value demands production and observation of goals and rules that 
orient their actions. A regime can be neglected by everyone who is not 
convinced by either the value or the programs for its realization, and 
competing regimes, instituting other ways of value-realization for the 
same domain, can be constituted.
In this reconstruction of transnational regimes, the delimitation of 
the demos cannot rely on the all-affected principle alone. It is very 
well possible that not all persons or collectives that are affected by the 
programs of a regime are eligible as part of its demos, and are allowed 
to participate in its discourses and decision-making processes. The 
demos should only consist of persons, associations and organizations 
that share the default value-orientation of the regime and accept 
manifestly that their actions are regulated by authoritative legislation 
that supports the work on its issue.48 Outsiders that signify this 
attitude and demand participation in the regime should be admitted. 
Admittance signalizes that they are recognized as serious contributors 
to the realization of the value(s) of the regime.
This argument makes NGO’s, corporations, and other organizations, 
being collectives of persons that want to advance the realization of 
a regime-value by means of regulated collective action, eligible as 
participants in transnational regimes. Parties that demand inclusion 
without willingness to contribute to value-realization should be 
refused. Corporations, states or NGO’s with the intention to weaken 
or subvert the value-orientation of a regime should be barred.
In other words, issue-based regimes should pay attention to their 
boundaries if they want to pursue the issue, which is the reason of 
their existence. They should formulate inclusion-exclusion-rules 
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Comment
evert van der Zweerde
Here, I fully agree. I think it is 
important to state, and emphasize, 
that every regime has its demos, just 
as any policy has its ‘affected’. The 
question is what this demos does, and 
what it can do, and what is the impact 
of those affected on this demos: 
are they part of it? Take human 
rights: there is a demos of Amnesty 
International, i.e. its members 
(or…?), but who are the relevant 
affected? At least those people who 
have become victims of the human 
rights violations of those regimes 
against the policies of which Amnesty 
is protesting. Strictly speaking, 
however, those affected are not the 
affected of Amnesty: those who are 
directly affected by Amnesty’s policies 
are those who get support, receive 
letters, etc. What then is the meaning 
of ‘demanding entrance and discuss 
joining’? The world, unfortunately 
perhaps, is not the comfort zone of 
discussion between Habermasians 
and their critics.
Comment
evert van der Zweerde
This remark presupposes that there 
can be ‘good reasons’ not to include 
someone. One could, however, argue, 
in line with Hannah Arendt on this 
point I think, that the very wish to 
be part of a polity, and thus enjoy 
the rights that that polity offers, but 
also accept the obligations implied, is 
sufficient reason.
reply
wil martens
The last three remarks seem to 
complement each other. They all 
are about the relationship between 
being affected and being part of the 
demos in the case of issue-based 
transnational regimes. First of all 
there is a difference between nation 
states and regimes. Persons want to 
be in (or enter) a nation state because 
they must be part of some organized 
collective in order to live. As soon as 
they are part of a nation state they are 
affected/subjected by it and should 
therefore be given influence on its 
rules. 
The basis for participation in a 
regime is different. Participants 
cannot generally be said to have 
an overwhelming interest in 
membership of the collective because 
they are in need of a collective that 
gives them security and chances for 
development. Sometimes this does 
play a minor role, but then only [...] 
that give participation rights only to those (collective) actors, who 
satisfy this criterion .49
This delimitation of the demos implies a farewell to the often held view 
that the demos must be pre-given for the purpose of legitimacy of rulers 
and regulation of a regime. This view is often criticized as unavoidably 
circular under the equally held presumption that the demos must 
constitute itself in a first founding decision.50 In my opinion, an issue-
based regime without demos cannot exist, as such a regime implies that 
value-oriented persons and collectives have entrusted a board with 
legislative power for the realization of its value, and in turn demand 
authoritative programs that support them in the realization.
The demos an issue-based regime implies is delimited and open at 
once . All persons and collectives that want to contribute to collective 
intentions concerning the regime-issue can discuss joining, and 
should in principle be admitted. Thus, the demos that has a right to 
influence the rules of the regime is probably fluctuating. But that is 
not problematic. On the contrary, the fluctuations of the boundaries of 
the demos rightly follow the fluctuations of the persons and collectives 
that want to oblige themselves to an organized pursuit of the value 
at issue. Another often discussed problem that confronts nation-
state-democracy is also prevented in issue-based voluntary regimes: 
the exclusion of persons that demand for inclusion, but are refused 
for no good reason .51 The regimes focused upon in this essay are 
not confronted with this problem if they refuse participation to those 
actors that are not willing to promote the default value. Nor does a 
huge mass of serious demands for admittance bring problems. Issue-
based regimes cannot become too crowded the way nation states can.
Ad. C. Pluralism. If transnational regimes are characterized by a default 
value-orientation and delimited by the rule that members should 
accept this value-orientation and the ensuing rules, one could suspect 
that they are characterized by one-sided value-orientations. Plurality 
would in this case only exist in the form of several one-sided regimes 
next to each other. Especially in absence of a worldwide public 
opinion and an overarching world-state, in which relative weights of 
values and relations between regimes are discussed and regulated, this 
could easily lead to a fragmentation of regimes and to contradictions 
between their programs.52
This fear is inappropriate, however. Value realization by means of 
a regime does not take place in a value-vacuum. It always involves 
objects and events that also have meanings and values in the context 
of the realization of other values. Land, animals, slaughter methods, 
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[...] for one issue of life. There are, 
however, also quite different interests. 
An important example is wanting to 
realize a value for a large community 
- often the whole world population 
- by organized collective activity. 
Besides, being part of such value-
realizing collectives can be realized 
by the production of new collectives. 
Different from nation states, regimes 
have no monopoly over an issue. This 
situation makes it legitimate to refuse 
those participants that do not want to 
work on the regime’s issue in a serious 
way. The cited criteria of Habermas 
and Arendt are formulated for the 
situation of nation states, and are in 
my opinion not useful for regimes.
Comment
evert van der Zweerde
Very good points! My only question 
concerns demarcation: the nation-
state has a clear ‘territory’, and one 
could argue that for any kind of 
‘regime’, its domain, which is not 
necessarily a territory, should be 
clearly defined. Or can it can be fuzzy?
reply
wil martens
I tried to make a start with an answer 
to this question in my considerations 
about the delimitation of the demos. 
There, I indicated that the boundaries 
of a demos, deciding about inclusion 
and exclusion of persons and 
collectives in/from a regime, appear 
to be fuzzy in the case of issue-
based regimes. This is the basis for 
my discussion of representation 
and public discussion. My proposal 
is: representation and discussion 
are a matter of values that are 
pursued by persons and collectives, 
and not simply of (proportional) 
representation of persons.
and transport have meaning and value in a food-safety regime, but 
also in the context of affordable food-supply, religious values and 
environmental protection. Goals and rules decided with regard to 
food-safety, prescribing certain cultivation procedures, could for 
example lead to unjust income distribution and environmentally 
detrimental transport movements. Such consequences for the 
realization of other values and interests are normally discussed in 
the opinion- and decision-making processes of regimes. In short, 
participants in issue-based regimes introduce lots of considerations 
about a variety of values, goals, meanings, rules and interests they 
find relevant for certain reasons. These considerations build the raw 
material for the conception of programs that could realize the default 
value, while also taking into account the other advanced values. 
Program proposals are brought under discussion and each participant 
pays attention to the values, goals, and rules that are relevant from her 
perspective; discussion leads to new proposals, to bargaining and at 
last to acceptable decisions. The outcome of discussion and decision-
making in regimes is thus accommodated to many values besides the 
default one(s).
But this accommodation is not clearly visible in the formulations 
of the goals and rules of the regime. These are explicitly presented 
as programs for the realization of the default value. The programs 
look therefore as if they were only about, say, food-safety. This 
gives regimes a one-dimensional image, which easily leads to their 
perception as technical matters that can be left to experts. This image 
is utterly improper.
Ad. D. Representation, Public discourse and Decision-making. Identification 
of the demos is a precondition for an answer to the question: How 
should legislation relate to the demos if it is to produce acceptable 
rules? The difference between issue-based transnational regimes and 
nation states makes an adoption of models that were developed in 
the latter impossible. An issue-based regime attempting to realize a 
default value in a social space that is populated by several values needs 
to invent new forms of (a) representation and (b) public discourse and 
decision-making .
(a) If the programs of an issue-based regime should accommodate 
not only the default value, but also the other values of the demos, the 
selection-procedure for the legislation of the demos must be such 
that it leads to the representation of these values and interests in the 
legislative bodies. Representation should, in other words, be couched 
in terms of relevant values.
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Comment
evert van der Zweerde
A relevant political question is: 
who decided about the domains of 
different regimes and about their 
border clashes, e.g. when human 
rights issues and environmental 
issues clash? How can those borders 
be established ‘democratically’? 
That is a different question than 
the question about the ‘internal’ 
deliberation and decision regarding 
values, goals, and priorities. Different 
regimes, each transnational, would 
seem to require a supra-transnational 
regime that establishes their 
interrelations. Would that have to 
be a (democratic) world-state? If not, 
what kind of form could it have?
reply
wil martens
 
The issues – concerning problems 
with value realization in a domain 
– are produced by the regimes 
themselves, slowly consolidating 
regular internal patterns and patterns 
of interaction with collectives in 
their environment. With regard to 
the relations between a plurality 
of regimes one can say that each 
regime is already occupied with 
accommodating several values in its 
programs. Preventing child-labor 
can for example perfectly be a point 
in a food-safety regime, although it 
is not its raison d’être. In such cases 
I see no necessity for supra-national 
regulation of relations between 
regimes. See also V.4.
In most transnational regimes this is not directly the case. They 
incorporate relevant non-focal values mostly by distinguishing parties 
that are differently affected by the regime and are therefore supposed 
to have different interests or stakes that should be taken into account.53 
The distinguished stakeholders all get a (more-or-less) reasonable 
amount of seats in legislative bodies. Sometimes this procedure 
involves distinguishing functional groups, like producers, traders, 
intermediates, scientists and consumers. In other cases it is supposed 
that the difference between North and South is an important indicator 
of divergent values and interests that should be accounted for in 
criteria for representation. Still other cases differentiate between social, 
economic and environmental values and interests, and look for their 
representation .54
On each of these criteria, the distinguished categories of participants 
appoint or select their own representatives in the legislative bodies. 
The representatives are held accountable for the values and interests 
of the groups they represent. Their values should be accommodated in 
the programs of the regime, which should thereby become acceptable 
for the different participants. The indicated procedures for the 
selection of representatives from the different constituents of the 
demos remain, however, indirect ways of getting relevant values into 
legislative boards. 
The various non-default values that exist in a demos can, however, also 
straightforwardly be taken as a point of departure.55 In this case values 
would be equally represented in advising and deciding committees 
that formulate programs for the realization of default and other 
value(s). Members of legislative committees function in this case as 
representatives of the values that are relevant for the demos of a regime. 
Democracy, in the sense of equal possibilities to influence 
authoritative regulation, would then concern the equal possibility 
of each value to be taken into account in the decisions about the 
realization of the default value. The chance of acceptable outcomes 
is optimal if the decisions about goals and rules are taken as workable 
agreements,56 looked after in discussions of the representatives, and if 
voting under majority rule is a last resort for decision-making. This 
indeed seems to be an option preferred in many regimes.
The problem then is to find a way to identify the relevant values, 
and the organizations and persons that can be their representatives. 
This essay is not the right place to propose a detailed and substantiated 
solution for these problems, but I will try to indicate the direction in 
which it can be found. In any issue-based regime where several parties 
cooperate, one finds discussions about the values that should be taken 
11
[130] [wil martens]
Comment
evert van der Zweerde
Allow me a hypothesis: I think that, 
ultimately, your dream is one of 
global enlightened despotism. This 
is, I think, the spontaneous position 
of any intelligent person who sees 
that there are many problems, from 
poverty to desertification, that can 
in principle be solved, and who also 
sees that national and international 
polities are never going to solve 
them. Global enlightened despotism, 
to be sure, probably is the only real 
solution, and it may well arrive some 
day, but: it forgets about politics, let 
alone democracy.
reply
wil martens
Enlightened despotism is certainly 
not the gist of my proposal, although 
a certain elitism might be its result, 
as in any case of government. It is 
political at least in the sense that in 
every regime there is a discussion 
about which values should be 
realized in which ways in collectively 
binding programs that are eventually 
enforced. It is democratic because it 
proposes equal influence to values 
that are at stake for persons that 
participate in the regime. But I 
agree, it all looks strange for eyes 
accustomed to the political stages of 
nation states.
into account. These discussions provide a first opportunity to identify 
the values that should be included in the discussions about programs. 
Demands for inclusion, coming from persons and organizations 
willing to contribute to the realization of the default value and 
claiming a right to represent their further values in the regime, provide 
a second opportunity. Such demands can be articulated by associations 
of directly affected persons, but also by experts or organizations that 
act on behalf of the affected persons. These articulations reveal in 
principle also the organizations and persons that could function as 
representatives in a regime’s legislative bodies.
(b) Discussion and decision-making. The indicated manner to discover 
values and their representatives demands a well functioning public 
discussion, and a firmly developed link between public discussion and 
the regime’s legislation. Members of legislative bodies are not able to 
represent values in absence of broad communication that articulates 
values, related meanings, and pros and cons of goals and rules. 
This communication can partly be organized by the regimes. In the 
example of food-safety that could for example be meetings, working 
groups, consultations, press and internet initiatives about the dangers 
of intoxication and environmental pollution, and the consequences of 
new rules for hygiene and pharmaceutical products devised to deal with 
these problems . Problems, values and programs should, however, 
also be openly discussed in a large public while remaining connected 
with the communications organized by the regimes. Representatives 
of values can thus be embedded in broad public discussions of the 
persons, associations and organizations they represent.57
Such communications demand a public space that is organized 
for the purpose of discussions about issues of transnational regimes. 
Discussions about transnational issues should be liberated from 
restrictions that are inherent to national public spheres that subordinate 
discussions on value-realization to national contexts in which voting 
for political parties that belong either to government or to opposition 
is central.58 The focus of ‘borderless’ public discussions should be right 
away on the production of programs for issues that balance default 
value and further values. They are about smart solutions that permit 
the combination of values, and the continuous cooperation between 
all the representatives of divergent values, which only together can 
realize the default value.59 
Democratizing issue-based transnational regimes demands in 
other words the development of transnational, issue-centered public 
discussion media that focus on values, regimes and programs that are 
useful in our lives.
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Ad E. Administration and adjudication. Transnational regimes are often 
described as networked forms of governance without government, 
relying primarily on non-hierarchical forms of steering, providing 
principles instead of laws. This description suggests that administration 
and adjudication, the traditional means of implementation of 
authoritative rules, are needless in transnational regimes.
Regimes produce in most cases, however, not only principles, but also 
obligatory rules. Their predictable application demands administration 
and adjudication.60 Regimes use administrations among others: to 
register and categorize members; to organize meetings of committees 
and member consultations; to be visible in public discussion and 
observe the development of public opinion; and, last but not least, 
to help the members to apply rules and to monitor and sanction 
(lacking) rule-application. Without organizational structures for these 
functions, regimes are not credible as regulators of the realization of 
important values, in which case it is useless to ratify rules, to declare 
them as binding, or to provide certifications.61
The execution of administrative functions should itself be regulated 
by authoritative rules. To fit in a democratic regime, administrations 
should be transparent and held accountable. Rules for decision-
making, about for example accreditation and certification, should be 
public, verifiable and recoverable.62 
Like in the nation states, the administrators are the professional 
experts in the regimes. If they keep away from acting purely as executors, 
and interact with the diverse members in the context of program 
application, they can conceive interpretations and specifications of 
rules that are acceptable and helpful for each of these members. And, 
at least in some regimes, monitoring is in the first place a matter of 
helping, not of sanctioning.63 This interpretation of their role allows 
administrators to be helpful in finding acceptable solutions for the 
realization of the variety of values that members of regimes care about.
Adjudication is needed for similar reasons as administration. Even when 
rules are produced in careful democratic processes, conflicts about 
their meaning in situ, and, at the limit, about their rightfulness, loom 
at the horizon. Was it a breach of the rules to employ these workers? 
Was the decision to refuse certification really taken in accordance 
with prescribed procedure? In this respect too, rules of transnational 
regimes are not different from nation state laws. They require dispute-
regulation mechanisms, which at once take care of conflict resolution 
and sanctioning of offenders. Fulfilling these functions also contributes 
to the closure of interpretive gaps in the rules, which in turn increases 
the predictability and coordination of actions.
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Comment
evert van der Zweerde
I think you are appealing to some 
intuition that I do not share. 
Constitutions are not inextricably 
linked to states, let alone nation-
states. So you are right, transnational 
regimes can also have constitutions, 
but why would that require arguing?
reply
wil martens
There is a discussion in the theory of 
law about the viability of the concept 
of constitution for supranational and 
transnational governance. I refer to 
that discussion here. I try to formulate 
arguments for a very broad concept 
of constitution, applicable to all 
kinds of regulated collectives. At the 
same time I emphasize that it makes 
sense to interpret constitutions in 
the context of democratizing these 
collectives. Constitutions alone 
cannot solve the problems related to 
power and governance. 
Many regimes now have rules and bodies for dispute resolution,64 
which adopt juridical forms that were developed in nation-states. In 
cases of disputes, they prescribe reason-giving, rights to be noticed and 
heard, due process and some form of judicial review of the rules crafted 
by the legislative bodies, to ensure accountability and transparency. 
Administrative law, which is a general provision in nation-states, thus 
gets embedded in individual regimes,65 producing ‘rule of law’ as far as 
the regime’s own regulation is concerned.66
The prescriptions of administrative law provide incentives for 
democratization. They involve discursive procedures, in which 
justifications for rules can be investigated and debated. Arguments 
produced therein can feed back to legislative bodies and enhance rule-
production.
Ad F. Constitution. Many transnational regimes nowadays are oriented 
by normative self-descriptions one can call constitutions.67 In short, 
regimes formulate normative meta-rules that describe what they 
should do, how this should be done, and which parts have which rights 
and obligations in doing. These normative self-descriptions have in 
main lines the same characteristics in regimes as in democratic nation-
states. Nation-state constitutions are said to be adjudicated legal 
norms which, as highest law, regulate the establishment and exercise of 
public power as they lay the basis of power in the demos.68 The existing 
normative self-descriptions of issue-based transnational regimes show 
that constitutions are not exclusive instruments of nation-states .
Regime-constitutions are useful instruments for the stabilization of 
orientations and expectations in- and outside the regimes. Inside the 
regime they orient legislation, allow a judicial review of its rules, and 
of the implementation of rules by administration and adjudication. 
In cases of uncertainty or conflict about rights and obligations of 
committees and members of the regime or about decision-making 
procedures, the meta-rules of a constitution provide a possibility of 
adjudication. Thus, a constitution provides possibilities for checks and 
protests in cases of false or excessive exercise of authority, and protects 
a regime against threatening disagreement and disobedience resulting 
from the plurality of values and interests.
V. Democratizing Issue-Based Subsystems of World-
Society 
Democratizing issue-based transnational regimes that include 
private participants of great importance may at first thought appear 
as a dangerous phantasm. Does not this form of governance, as a 
16
17
1
[133][democracy for transnational regimes]
Comment
evert van der Zweerde
True, but only because they 
are agenda-setting and value-
establishing institutions, which 
have their internal ‘law-making’, but 
cannot make laws and enforce them 
outside their own organization. The 
big difference between a state and a 
transnational regime, it seems to me, 
is that a state both organizes itself 
and the society of which it is the state, 
whereas transnational regimes can 
only organize themselves internally 
through ‘legislation’.
reply
wil martens
Prima facie your argument seems 
plausible. It entails, however, a con-
ceptual flaw. 
It compares the whole of a trans-
national regime with the state that 
organizes a lot of societal subsys-
tems by means of legislation. But 
one should compare a transnational 
regime with a society and its state, 
and the state with the legislating 
and organizing part of a transnation-
al regime. As soon as this is done, 
it becomes immediately clear that 
transnational regimes have their own 
political and administrative organiza-
tion – one could say, their own state 
– which is, however, only organizing 
with regard to one issue in our life. So 
actually, the main difference seems to 
be that in cases of transnational re-
gimes, there is an own legislation and 
administration for each issue, whereas 
traditional nation states have placed 
governance of all its issues and their 
societal subsystems in the hands of 
one political and administrative or-
ganization.
consequence of participation of corporations and NGO’s, sooner 
endanger than advance democracy? On further analysis the contrary 
proves to be true: these regimes have an aptitude for the democratic 
realization of broadly shared, important values. Their basic structures 
are probably better suited for democracy than those of the nation-
states .
The aptitude for democracy remains, however, invisible as long as 
the regimes are observed from the perspective of the idea of democracy 
that was developed for the nation state. If we look at transnational 
regimes as continuations of national democracies, we are confronted 
with very bleak prospects for their democratization, and, because of 
their continuous expansion, for the possibility of democracy at large. 
That is, in an exemplary manner, visible in Habermas’s attempt to 
provide such a reconstruction. The democratic potentials of ‘private’ 
regimes only become visible if they are looked for in their own 
structures. This perspective demands that the contents of concepts like 
demos, representation, public discussion, and constitution drastically 
move away from the contents of these concepts that are typical for 
nation-state-democracy. This conceptual change is a prerequisite for 
an adequate description and assessment of transnational regimes.
Having abandoned the project of democratizing transnational regimes 
on the basis of national democracy, the central question is: What could 
be the meaning of ‘autonomous democratization’ of these regimes? 
The first step towards such a conception of democracy consists in 
the conceptualization of their peculiar social nature. Transnational 
regimes are typically concerned with ‘issues’, like child labor or 
food-safety, which are junctions of values and domains. Members 
of a regime worry about typical states of affairs, which are generally 
considered as problems that should be resolved or prevented. These 
problems affect a multitude of persons and organizations, which 
pursue, besides the default value of the regime, a lot of divergent values 
and interests. The demos, in the sense of those who should have a voice 
in the regime, consists only of persons, associations and organizations 
that share the default value-orientation of the regime and accept that 
their actions are regulated by authoritative legislation on behalf of its 
realization. Remediation of the problematic issues requires regulation 
of the actions of the partly diverging participants. Regimes result from 
attempts to continuously regulate actions in these respects.
Political processes of representation, legislation, public discourse, and 
administration and adjudication are all centered around the balanced 
realization of the default value and the further values of the participants. 
The selection of representatives should warrant that relevant values 
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are included in the legislative bodies that produce the programs. Rules 
for discussion and legislation should preclude that relevant values 
are disregarded. This happens based on public discussions organized 
around the regulated issue, in which possibly relevant problems, 
solutions and representatives emerge, and in which the adequacy of 
representatives and their legislation can be tested. This constellation 
of political processes produces regulative programs, which appear as 
reasonable and acceptable and are therefore experienced as legitimate.
The implementation of legitimate programs in transnational regimes 
is not as soft as sometimes is suggested. Rules are often binding and 
not just suggestions to ‘the’ participants in the regime. The divergence 
of values and the cognitive and motivational characteristics of the 
participants make a reliable implementation of programs dependent 
on administration, and adjudication. These organizations help in most 
regimes to specify the rules, to monitor and enforce their execution, 
and to assist in the solution of disputes between participants 
with divergent values. Together they overcome the cognitive and 
motivational problems that remain even in regimes where participants 
agree about the main values their cooperative efforts are oriented at.
It is a mistake to characterize transnational regimes mainly in terms 
of civil discourse,69 of administrative law or of constitutionalization.70 
Regimes cannot be reduced to a kind of autonomous public discourse, 
or to public discourses that prepare and criticize legislation, 
administration and adjudication of external state (based) authorities. 
Neither are they merely forms of juridical regulation. Transnational 
regimes consist of the full range of regulatory forms – legislation, 
public discourse, administration, adjudication and constitution – that 
were invented in nation-states, and are now being adapted to the 
specific social nature of transnational regimes.
Transnational regimes are not produced by external state (based) 
authorities; they are self-constituted in the course of searching for an 
organized answer to urgent social problems. In this sense they clearly 
differ from the equally issue-based regimes for health-care, energy or 
food-safety developed within nation-states, where basic rules for all 
regimes are produced by a single national legislation.
Repeatedly occurring self-constitution around issues, producing full 
ranges of regulatory forms in each of the produced regimes, leads to 
an abundance of autonomous, self-contained, differently oriented, 
and explicitly regulated social systems, existing alongside each other. 
However, these characteristics of transnational regimes do not imply 
that they are one-dimensional, in the sense of a closure for other 
4
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Comment
stefan sChevelier
Why would they replace a world of 
nation-states? I thought you had just 
argued for a diversified system that 
has both transnational issue-based 
regimes and national demos-based 
regimes.
reply
wil martens
Maybe it is better to say that 
democratic transnational regimes 
seem to be the right form of 
governance in those cases where 
an issue is identified that requires 
coordination beyond the borders 
of a nation state. This could lead 
to a wide range of issue-based 
combinations of governance and 
governed. This would bring about 
a government, working as good as 
it can, for each issue world-wide. If 
these issue-governments could be 
truly democratic that would probably 
be the best possible governance for 
the issues concerned, better than a 
situation in which one government 
is responsible for all issues of the 
population of a restricted territory. 
There could be influence of the demos 
and accountability to the demos, for 
each separate issue. In the case of the 
nation state, democracy for all issues 
is blended, with unclear influence 
and accountability as a result.
values. Democratization is important in this respect. Democratized 
regimes incorporate a plurality of values that are discussed in public, 
represented in legislation, and communicated in administration 
and adjudication. The programs and practices of regimes thereby 
accommodate a plurality of values. Amongst these values are in many 
cases so-called human rights. 
Perceived in this way a broad manifold of democratic transnational 
regimes appears as a realistic utopia. For many respects of social life 
they are more than worthy replacements of the rules coming from a 
fragmented world of nation-states . 
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